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INTRODUCTION 
     NASA has been conducting decommissioning 
activities at its PBRF for the last decade.   As a result 
of all this work there have been several „lessons 
learned‟, both good and bad.  This paper presents 
some of the more exportable lessons. 
PBRF BACKGROUND 
     The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Plum Brook Reactor Facility 
(PBRF) is located in Sandusky, Ohio, approximately 
50 miles west of the NASA Glenn Research Center in 
Cleveland.  It was used to expose test materials to a 
high neutron flux, and then to perform the post-
exposure testing to determine any changes in 
properties.  This testing was performed in support of 
the NERVA and ROVER nuclear rocket programs. 
     The main reactor was a 60 MW pressurized water 
reactor. It had numerous ports and tubes for inserting 
test specimens.  There were also several fast neutron 
beam tubes and a large tube that provided a 
thermalized neutron beam.  It had one test loop that 
ran at liquid helium temperatures, with capability to 
perform in-core tensile testing or fatigue testing of 
material specimens to failure.  Fig. 1 shows a 
cutaway section of the main reactor. 
      A series of seven hot cells (the largest rated for 
1.5 million curies) was connected to the reactors by 
means of a 25‟ deep water filled canal system.  
Irradiated experiments could safely be transferred by 
means of a remote operated monorail on the bottom 
of the canal, and associated cranes. 
     Construction began in 1958. The plant was 
operated from 1961 to 1973, accumulating a total of 
98,000 MW hours of operation.   With the end of 
Apollo and the termination of the nuclear rocket 
program the decision was made to shut down PBRF.  
It was placed in Safe Dry Storage.  Fig. 2 shows the 
PBRF during this shutdown period.  
 
Fig. 1. Cutaway view of the main reactor  
 
Fig. 2. View of the PBRF circa1995 
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     In 1999 NASA began predecommissioning, and 
full decommissioning began in 2002 with the NRC 
approval of the Decommissioning Plan (D-Plan).  
NASA expects to finish field work in 2010, then to 
request license termination after Final Status Survey 
(FSS) completion in 2011.  Demolition of structures 
and site restoration to a green field will be in 2013. 
     Over the course of the decommissioning several 
lessons have been learned, both good and bad.  In 
some cases these may be called „lessons relearned‟ 
since we were not the first to experience them, but 
they are important enough to bear repeating.  What 
follows, in no particular order of importance, are 
some of the more exportable lessons. 
LESSON #1 – CONTRACTING 
      At the start of the decommissioning very few 
NASA employees were left who had worked at the 
reactor when it was operating.  Those that had were 
close to retirement and had no decommissioning 
experience.  Rather than hire a cadre of civil servants 
for a one-of-a-kind project NASA‟s original idea was 
to hire one knowledgeable manager to oversee the 
project, and then to team with another experienced 
government agency that would actually perform or 
contract out the work. 
     NASA began the project under a Space Act 
Agreement.  This is the standard interagency 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) used by 
NASA.  In practice this is a rather generic 
„gentlemen‟s agreement‟ without enforceable clauses 
or conditions.  The other agency did have a contract 
with the decommissioning contractor they hired, but 
NASA had no such privity of contract.  As a result 
NASA, the NRC licensee, had no ability to give 
direction directly to the contractor except in 
imminent safety situations.  Management became 
overly complex, communication slow, document 
preparation and review interminable.  Everyone 
involved was greatly frustrated.  If the licensee is not 
self performing they must at least contract directly 
with the prime contractor. 
      When the Space Act Agreement expired it was 
not renewed, and NASA took the opportunity to 
restructure the project.  This included issuing a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the remaining 
decommissioning work.  With this structure in place 
NASA has had the necessary level of control.  
Ironically this has reduced the number of personnel 
required to manage the project.  Streamlined 
organizations make project life much easier for all 
layers of the organization. 
LESSON #2 – ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
     Both the licensee and the contractor will want to 
be able to demonstrate they have a staff sufficient in 
number and experience to execute their work.  
Confusion about roles and responsibilities will lead to 
larger staffs than necessary, work being done twice 
(or not at all), and a lack of clarity as to who has 
authority.  The solution is to document roles and 
responsibility in writing in a very clear and formal 
document.  If the licensee is going to contract out the 
work then this document should be part of the RFP so 
the bidders know clearly what is expected of them 
and what the limits of their authority will be. 
     The actual goal is to have a competent core group 
of professionals who, regardless of employer, are 
working together for a safe and efficient project.  
This sounds obvious, but it is one of the toughest 
management challenges.  If handled correctly it also 
has tremendous payback in project cost, schedule, 
and general job satisfaction. 
LESSON #3 – INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS  
     Work hard to establish and maintain clear and 
open 2-way communication channels throughout the 
project.  Be clear on reporting requirements and keep 
them to a minimum.  If you are not going to make 
specific use of some data or written report, don‟t 
collect it – doing so costs you money for no return.  
Worse, it distracts you (and your contractor) from the 
information that does matter. 
     When there is an incident don‟t be afraid to use a 
formal critique process to find out the facts.  
Remember, though, you want to determine what went 
wrong and how to prevent a recurrence, not who to 
hang.  Shoot the messenger once and you‟ll never get 
the truth again. 
LESSON #4 – EXTERNAL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
      Whether or not it is regulatorily required, have an 
aggressive, proactive community outreach effort.  
Get the local media and public involved early so that 
you can control how the story gets out.  Give them 
facts, explain your plans, listen to their concerns.  
The goal is risk communication, not public relations. 
     Communication must be two way – people are 
much more accepting of a risk if they feel they have 
some input into the process.  This continued effort 
builds deposits in the „trust bank‟, which you may 
need to draw on later in the project when you find a 
surprise that affects the public.  If you wait until then 
to be „open and honest‟ it‟s too late, and your job will 
become infinitely harder.   
LESSON #5 – CHARACTERIZATION 
     Characterize early and often.  When you are done, 
characterize some more.  While you‟ll never have 
enough data you still need to start decommissioning 
some time.  As equipment is removed though, and as 
the area dose levels drop characterization must 
continue.  New information may even justify a 
change in planned approach.  Plan and budget for 
continuing characterization until the end of the 
project. 
     An example from Plum Brook has to do with 
embedded pipe Derived Concentration Clean Up 
Levels (DCGLs).  Originally there were two DCGLs, 
based on two different isotopic mixtures known to be 
in the main piping systems.  As additional systems 
were opened, and further characterization was 
performed, additional isotopic mixtures were 
discovered.  Eventually eight different DCGLs were 
used.  This ensured cleanup efforts were correct for 
each section of pipe. 
     In another area a highly contaminated floor was 
shaved clean.  Post remediation characterization, 
however, showed the existence of contamination in 
cracks in the surface.  These cracks were not 
detectable until the general area dose rate had been 
reduced.    
LESSON #6 – OFFSITE CONTAMINATION 
     If your plant had an offsite discharge path, even if 
there is no record of anything going out above limits, 
there is the possibility that natural processes 
concentrated contamination such that you now have 
an impacted area that requires clean up.  
Environmental surveys performed during operations 
are typically aimed at detecting a discharge at or near 
the limit, with instrument whose sensitivity is 
appropriate for this purpose. 
      During Final Status Survey (FSS) you will be 
looking at „potentially impacted areas‟ with much 
more sensitive instruments, and if there was natural 
concentration you may be unpleasantly surprised to 
find your cleanup growing.  In the case of PBRF 
water containing Cs-137 had been discharged for 
years below legal release limits to an open ditch.  
Environmental monitoring detected no problem.  
Unfortunately, the sediment in the ditch contained 
high levels of a type of clay that latches onto cesium 
and doesn‟t let go.  Over time this clay had built up 
detectable levels of Cs-137, and then had worked its 
way 5 miles downstream through repeated erosion, 
deposition, and re-erosion.  While the levels were 
eventually determined not to represent a risk to 
public health (average 1.5 pCi/g) it was an expensive 
and lengthy process to prove it.   
      It is recommended to perform surveys of 
potentially impacted offsite areas using FSS 
sensitivity instruments at the beginning of  the 
decommissioning.  It is much better to find any 
unpleasant surprises as early as possible. 
LESSON #7 – SAFE STORAGE PLANTS 
     There are several lessons that apply specifically to 
plants where a significant period of time has passed 
between operations and decommissioning. 
7A – Equipment 
     Maintenance of non-essential plant infrastructure 
is usually minimal during storage periods.  The 
problem is that what was not essential during 
shutdown may be needed to support 
decommissioning.  Examples include overhead 
cranes, roll up doors, HVAC, utilities, and water 
treatment systems.  The project should plan sufficient 
time and budget to restore these systems from 
mothball to operational status.  
7B – Procedures 
      The procedures used to operate the plant 20- 30 
years ago will likely prove inadequate to today‟s 
standards, and likely do not address many of the 
issues that decommissioning involves.  The project 
should plan on the time and budget necessary to put 
new procedures in place before mobilizing field 
workers to site.  Also, be wary of anyone who says 
“We can take the procedures from XYZ plant and 
just change the cover” – it‟s rarely that easy. 
7C- Retirees  
      If the plant has been shutdown long enough there 
may be few, if any, personnel still working who 
actually were there during operations.  This gap in 
corporate knowledge may be filled by finding and 
tapping into the pool of retirees in your area.  Besides 
helping with the Historic Site Assessment (they know 
where the skeletons are buried) they can quickly find 
things in the operating day records that you might not 
even know existed to go look for.  They can often 
explain why something in the plant is not the way the 
drawings show, since they remember when and why 
the change was made.  Additionally, as long time 
local residents they have a good level of credibility 
with the public, and so can help with your outreach 
efforts.  
LESSON #8 – WASTE STREAMS 
      Waste volumes have the ability, more than any 
other issue, to blow your budget apart.  Insure you 
give a lot of thought to this for the full lifetime of 
your project, and always consider the impact of any 
trade study (Rip and Ship vs. Decontamination and 
FSS vs. some mix of the two) on waste stream 
composition, volume, and cost.  Insure you have a 
viable disposal path for all waste before it is 
generated. 
LESSON #9 – PLANNING THE END GAME 
      There is a tendency to spend a lot of time and 
effort planning the front end of the project, where 
dose rates are high and things are exciting.  Then, the 
„boring and easy‟ part of deconning concrete and soil 
and doing FSS comes along; by comparison this is 
often given much less forethought.   The truth is that 
once the buildings are empty there is still a lot of 
work to be done.  As Lesson #8 shows insufficient 
planning of this phase can leave you very short of 
budget and schedule, especially if surprises earlier in 
the project have already eaten your reserves.  Make 
sure that adequate thought is given in advance to the 
entire project, that trade studies are not biased by the 
capabilities or preferences of your prime, and that 
estimates for things like FSS are done by people who 
actually have real world experience with it. 
LESSONS #10 – HAVE FUN! 
      Decommissioning is serious work, with real 
challenges and significant risks to both radiological 
and industrial health.  It is also professionally 
challenging, rarely boring, constantly surprising, 
always educational, and a great opportunity to meet 
and work with a wide range of competent and 
dedicated professionals.  Do the work, but recognize 
the positives in your „daily grind‟ and have fun!      
SUMMARY 
1. The licensee must have privity of contract 
with the decommissioning contractor. 
2. Formal roles and responsibilities should be 
established right up front. 
3. Have strong and open 2-way communication 
within the project. 
4. Have a proactive, open public outreach 
effort that puts deposits in the „trust bank‟. 
5. Characterize, characterize, characterize. 
6. If you discharged offsite, even legally, 
expect to at least investigate. 
7. If a plant has been in safe storage for more 
than a few years special efforts must be 
planned for and made in the areas of 
equipment, procedures, and retirees. 
8. Decommissioning planning should focus on 
waste stream types, volumes, and available 
disposal paths and costs. 
9. Don‟t wait until the „hard part‟ is done to 
plan the end of the project in detail – that 
last 10% will rapidly grow to eat your 
reserves. 
10. It can be a great job – have fun! 
